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COMMENT 
A Cure for Collusive Settlements:  
The Case for a Per Se Prohibition on  
Pay-for-Delay Agreements in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation 
MICHAEL OWENS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The legal standard for evaluating reverse payments in pharmaceutical 
infringement settlements (or “pay-for-delay” settlements) has become a high-
ly controversial issue over the past decade and a half.1  Under a pay-for-delay 
agreement, a manufacturer of a brand-name pharmaceutical will settle patent 
infringement litigation by making payments to a defendant generic manufac-
turer in exchange for the generic manufacturer refraining from entering the 
market.2 These agreements have important implications for both patent law 
and antitrust law because they can allow a potentially invalid patent to remain 
in effect and restrain competition.3  Judges, commentators and antitrust en-
forcement bodies have all reached widely divergent conclusions regarding the 
appropriate antitrust treatment for these settlements, and while academic dis-
agreement is certain to persist, a single legal standard has been established in 
FTC v. Actavis4 (previously FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals), which re-
solved a circuit split created by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit’s July 2012 decision, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation.5  The K-
Dur decision brought to head the conflict over of pay-for-delay settlements 
and, in holding such agreements to be presumptively illegal, rejected prece-
dent established by three separate courts of appeals.6  The Supreme Court’s 
  
 * B.A. Economics, University of Missouri, 2007; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2014; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013. 
Many thanks to Professor Thom Lambert for his guidance and encouragement 
throughout this process. 
 1. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013), rev’g FTC v. Watson 
Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 2. See id. at 2231, 2234-35. 
 3. See id. at 2234. 
 4. Id. at 2237. 
 5. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 6. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD 
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decision in Actavis announced the “rule of reason” as the controlling liability 
rule for what some commentators have called “one of the most important 
business decisions that the court will have issued in quite some time.”7   
This Comment will examine how the particulars of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the regulatory scheme that governs generic competition in pharmaceuti-
cal industry, gives rise to reverse settlements in infringement litigation;8 re-
view existing analysis of the pay for delay problem in judicial decisions, in 
academic commentary, and amongst antitrust enforcement bodies;9 and final-
ly, draw upon a decision theoretic framework to propose per se illegality as 
the appropriate antitrust rule for pay-for-delay settlements.10   
II.  THE RECIPE FOR REVERSE PAYMENTS: OVERLAP OF ANTITRUST, 
PATENT LAW, AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION   
A. Antitrust Law and the Prohibition on  
Agreements to Restrain Competition 
Reverse payments raise problems under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
(Section 1), which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspira-
cy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations.”11  The rationale for antitrust enforcement is to promote “unfettered 
competition as the [fundamental] rule of trade.”12  This rationale  
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, 
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the 
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.13   
Justice Hugo Black has emphasized that “even were that premise open to 
question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”14  
The most commonly accepted policy goal underlying antitrust law’s         
reverence for competition is protecting consumers from artificially reduced 
  
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 7. Jonathan Stempel, Supreme Court to Hear “Pay-for-Delay” Drug Case, 
REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 12/07/us-
usa-court-drugs-payfordelay-idUSBRE8B617T20121207?%20irpc=932.  
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV.  
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 12. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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output and the resulting artificial price increases.15  Proposed goals that have 
received less judicial recognition include: protecting small business from 
larger firms, preventing transfer of wealth from consumers to producers,    
and promoting innovation.16  Though these goals are frequently in har-   
mony with each other, these secondary goals will generally yield to the ques-
tion of whether a given practice tends to increase or decrease output in a  
given market.17 
To this end, the Supreme Court has interpreted this broad language to 
apply only to “unreasonable” restraints on trade, rather than any agreement 
that literally restrains trade.18  In applying Section 1, courts have developed 
three methods of inquiry: a “per se” rule of illegality for restraints that are 
blatantly anticompetitive; a “quick-look” analysis for restraints that appear 
anticompetitive but have plausible pro-competitive justifications; and a wide 
open “rule-of-reason” analysis for restraints that have ambiguous effects on 
competition and require a more extensive balancing of pro and anticompeti-
tive effects.19  As applied, these categories are not as rigid as they may initial-
ly appear, and “are best viewed, as a continuum on which the amount and 
range of information needed to evaluate a restraint varies depending on how 
highly suspicious and how unique the restraint is.”20   
The harshest form of antitrust condemnation, “per se illegality,” is re-
served for practices so blatantly injurious to competition that further inquiry 
is unnecessary, even with respect to actual harm caused.21  These generally 
include horizontal agreements between direct competitors in the same mar-
ket,22 horizontal market allocation,23 and horizontal refusals to deal.24  Hori-
  
 15. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1696, 1703 (1986). 
 16. See id. at 1704-05. 
 17. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The core question in antitrust is output.  Unless a         
contract reduces output in some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no 
antitrust problem.”). 
 18. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). 
 19. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1310-11 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settle-
ment of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2003)). 
 20. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508-09 (4th Cir. 
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,            
768 (1984). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
 23. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. 
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 
341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
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zontal restraints receive harsher treatment because they turn what would oth-
erwise be a competitive relationship into a cooperative one, leading to higher 
prices and lower output without any offsetting consumer benefit.25  Because 
pay-for-delay settlements constitute an agreement not to compete between 
would-be competitors, there is no question that these agreements meet the 
categorical criteria for per se illegality.26  The question becomes whether the 
lawful right to exclude conferred by the patents underlying these disputes 
warrants a departure from per se illegality, and if so, to what extent. 
B.  Patent Law and Its Unique Role in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Despite the obvious antitrust concerns, reverse payments are plausibly a 
legal exercise of the exclusionary rights granted under the system of patent 
laws authorized by Article I of the U.S. Constitution.27 This clause grants 
Congress the power to pass laws that “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28  There are two 
primary objectives of the patent system: to promote public disclosure of in-
ventions and to encourage innovation by rewarding inventors with the time-
limited right “to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or sell-
ing the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into 
the United States.”29  By rewarding a patentee with monopoly power (i.e., the 
power to charge prices appreciably above the costs of production without 
incurring dramatic losses in sales),30 the patentee realizes a level of return on 
its innovation greater than it would have absent patent protection.  Simple 
economic theory predicts that a greater expected return on innovation will 
result in a higher level of innovative activities, such as research, development, 
and testing.31  Economic theory also predicts that the availability of patent 
protection will result in lower output and higher prices than would occur in 
competitive markets.32  Because the inventor enjoys this reward at the ex-
  
 24. See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); 
Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
 25. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608. 
 26. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[W]hatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so 
far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable 
to all industries alike.” (quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222)). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (2006). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry – Prices and Progress, 351 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 929 (2004). 
 32. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 75, 80 (2005). 
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pense of efficient allocation of the patented subject matter, the inventor is 
required to disclose how to make and use the invention, enabling the public to 
have unrestricted access to the patent after the term expires.33  The underlying 
rationale for granting patents to protect new innovations is simple enough: by 
conferring a legally protected monopoly for those who bring innovations into 
existence, the system encourages innovation-producing activities.34  Patent 
policy therefore encompasses a set of legislative judgments about the proper 
long run balance between competition and innovation.35 
Patent prosecution begins with a prospective patentee filing an applica-
tion with the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO).36  There, 
patent examiners evaluate whether the claimed invention is novel and non-
obvious as compared to relevant prior art.37  The invention is patentable if it 
is a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”38  The scope of the exclu-
sionary right conferred by a patent is defined by the “claims” of the patent, 
each of which must independently be novel,39 non-obvious,40 and described 
“in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the [invention].”41  If success-
ful in prosecuting a patent, the applicant will be awarded a twenty-year right 
“to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the inven-
tion throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States,”42 which will generally commence on the date of the earliest filing of 
an application.43  
Perhaps more so than in any other industry, patents are recognized as     
a necessary driver of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry.44  A  
new drug is best understood as an information good – a commodity that   
derives its main value from the information it contains.45  It can take         
several hundred million dollars to discover, develop, and gain regulatory  
approval for a new drug.46  Without patent protection, rival firms could simp-
  
 33. See § 154. 
 34. See Scherer, supra note 31, at 928. 
 35. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 19, at 1729. 
 36. See § 153. 
 37. See §§ 102-03. 
 38. § 101. 
 39. See § 102. 
 40. § 103. 
 41. § 112. 
 42. § 154(a)(1). 
 43. § 154(a)(2). 
 44. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement 
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562-63 (2006). 
 45. See Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuti-
cals, 5 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002). 
 46. See id. 
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ly free-ride off of the innovator’s research, development, and FDA approval 
and offer the compound without the tremendous expenses incurred by         
the innovator to bring the drug into existence.47  Because duplication costs for 
pharmaceuticals are extremely low relative to the innovator’s costs of discov-
ering and developing a new compound, the free rider problem threatens        
to drive research and development far below socially optimal levels.48     
Studies have estimated that, while 86% of innovations across all industries 
would have been developed even without patent protection, only 40%           
of pharmaceutical innovations would have been developed absent patent pro-
tection.49  Even commentators skeptical of patent policy’s role in stimulating 
research and development often note an exception in the context of pharma-
ceutical innovation.50   
One recurring problem in evaluating the pay-for-delay dilemma is the 
relatively cursory nature of the inspection that that the USPTO gives an   
application when considering whether to grant a patent.51  There are several 
reasons why the USPTO conducts “surprisingly little actual assessment of 
whether a patent should issue.”52  First, patent prosecution is conducted        
ex parte, meaning that the only parties involved in the application process are 
the applicant and the patent examiner.53  There is little incentive for extensive 
discovery of information that would be adverse to the issuance of the patent, 
and as a result, such information is unlikely to come to light during the appli-
cation process.  For example, applicants are required to submit only the    
relevant prior art “of which they are aware.”54  Applicants “are under no obli-
gation to search for prior art, and most do not.”55  The patent examiner then 
has the sole burden of considering “the application, searching for and identi-
fying the relevant prior art, . . . deciding whether the application should be 
allowed by comparing the claims to the prior art, and writing an ‘Office   
Action’ explaining the reasons why any claims were rejected.”56  The appli-
  
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. FTC, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION IN THE NEW HIGH-
TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 6-6 to 6-8 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opp/global/report/gc_vl.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from            
Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 
783, 795-96, 819 (discussing a survey commenced in 1981 that shows that pharma-
ceutical and other chemical manufacturers valued patents particularly highly as means 
of appropriation). 
 51. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1499-1500 (2001). 
 52. Id. at 1499. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1499-1500; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). 
 55. Lemley, supra note 51, at 1500. 
 56. Id. 
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cant will usually submit a response to the Office Action, and the process    
can repeat itself many times for a single application.57  The average time 
spent examining a patent ends up totaling about eighteen hours and costing 
about $20,000.58  This may not seem like inadequate examination, but in the 
patent litigation context, “lawyers and technical experts will spend hundreds 
and perhaps even thousands of hours” analyzing prior art and reexamining the 
claims and prosecution history to assess precisely the same validity issues 
that are decided with a fraction of the resources and incentives for accurate 
determination at the USPTO.59  It therefore should be unsurprising that the 
USPTO issues many patents that it would otherwise not issue if the examiners 
possessed better information.60  Much for this reason, of patent challenges 
that are litigated to conclusion, the patent at issue is held invalid forty-six 
percent of the time.61 
Although patent examiners make validity determinations while operat-
ing under a considerable degree of ignorance as to material information, the 
system is a likely sensible arrangement.62  This ignorance is rational because 
the benefits from patent examiners discovering additional information rele-
vant to initial validity determinations would not be justified by the costs.63  
First, “the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even li-
censed.”64  Nearly two thirds of all patents issued lapse for failure to pay 
maintenance fees, half of which do so even before the first half of the patent 
term has passed.65  A very small percentage is licensed,66 and an even smaller 
percentage is litigated.67  With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that a vast 
  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1499-1500. 
 59. Id. at 1502. 
 60. Id. at 1500. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 1514. 
 63. See id. at 1497. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1503 n.34 (“Maintenance fees are due in increasing amounts at periods 
of three and a half years, seven and a half years, and eleven and a half years after the 
patent issues.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. Id. at 1503 (“Obviously, though, many patents that do remain in force never 
get litigated.  Some of these patents are licensed for royalties without litigation.  Sur-
prisingly, it does not appear that anyone knows precisely how many patents are   
licensed for royalties.  There are reasons to believe, however, that the number is      
not large.”). 
 67. Id. at 1501 (“Of the roughly two million patents currently in force, only a  
tiny number are the basis for lawsuits each year.  About 1,600 patent lawsuits are  
filed each year, involving at most perhaps 2,000 different patents.  The over-
whelming majority of these lawsuits settle or are abandoned before trial.  Only about 
one hundred cases per year (and 125 patents) actually make it to trial.  Based on   
these numbers, it is reasonable to estimate that at most only about two percent of      
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number of patents did not justify the initial costs of determining validity and 
certainly would not have justified any additional costs.68  As a result, the most 
efficient way to determine patent validity is to tolerate a necessarily cursory 
initial inspection by the USPTO and, if it later turns out that there is sufficient 
commercial stake in determining the validity of a patent, rely on the courts to 
conduct a more costly and extensive reevaluation of validity in the course of 
litigation.69  While this is a reasonable approach to administering a remarka-
bly ambitious system, an inevitable result is that a large number of objective-
ly invalid patents will issue.70  This result reveals the importance of courts’ 
ability to conduct ex poste reevaluations of patent validity.71  One of the fun-
damental problems with pay-for-delay settlements is permitting parties to 
avert this reevaluation.72   
This present analysis will draw heavily upon the “probabilistic” nature 
of patents as described by Lemley and Shapiro, which emphasizes that pa-
tents are not so much rights to exclude as they are rights to try to exclude 
rivals by asserting patent rights in court.73  Lemley and Shapiro explain: 
“When a patent holder asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the pa-
tent holder is rolling the dice.  If the patent is found invalid, the property right 
will have evaporated.”74  This understanding of patent rights demonstrates the 
inadequacy of looking to the formal scope of a patent to excuse or condemn 
exclusionary conduct because the only time when the status of the patent 
rights is conclusively known is upon a final judgment.75  Part of the appeal of 
deferring to the formal scope of the patent is the statutory presumption of 
validity afforded to patent rights,76 which challengers can only rebut by “clear 
and convincing evidence.”77  This presumption is factually unwarranted based 
on how the USPTO actually makes validity determinations.78  But even if the 
  
all patents are ever litigated, and less than two-tenths of one percent of all issued 
patents actually go to court.”). 
 68. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 82 (discussing the reasons why 
inventors file many patents that turn out to have little or no value, including “a failure 
to understand the value of patents; the use of patents to obtain financing and boost 
market valuation; the use of patents as signaling mechanisms; and the ‘defensive’ use 
of patents to deter others from suing.  Even individually weak patents might have 
value as part of a large patent portfolio, because the portfolio can be licensed as a 
block or can serve to deter lawsuits.” (citations omitted)). 
 69. See Lemley, supra note 51, at 1531. 
 70. Id. at 1532. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See infra Part III.D. 
 73. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 75.  
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). 
 77. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
 78. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
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presumption is generally defensible on judicial economy grounds,79 relying 
on this presumption in the context of pay-for-delay settlements is not.  In this 
context, the general presumption effectively transforms into a conclusive one 
because settlement precludes the opportunity for challenge to the patent’s 
presumed validity.80  Exclusionary rights that are really only probabilistic are 
transformed into certain rights for reasons unrelated to the substantive merits 
of the patent.81  Examining the regulatory quirks of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
will help reveal why seemingly adversarial parties are united in their desire to 
avert challenges to the validity of brand-name manufacturers’ patents. 
C.  The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Regulation of Generic Entry 
Pay-for-delay settlements are a unique product of the regulatory scheme 
created under the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act (Hatch-Waxman),82 which amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act.83  The Act created a regulatory scheme governing the approval of 
generic drugs by the FDA.84  The law sought to help jumpstart generic com-
petition with brand-name pharmaceuticals85 and has been tremendously suc-
cessful in this regard.  Since the passage of Hatch-Waxman, the number of 
total prescriptions written for generic drugs has increased from fifteen percent 
to seventy percent.86  In furtherance of this goal, Hatch-Waxman enacted two 
key features that are responsible for the proliferation of pay-for-delay agree-
ments in the industry: the availability of Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(ANDAs), and 180-day exclusivity bounty for the first generic entrant to suc-
cessfully challenge the patent.87  
  
 79. See, e.g., Meredith Norris, Note, Clear and Convincing Evidence as Proper 
Standard of Proof for a Patent Invalidity Defense Under § 282 of the Patent Act of 
1952: Microsoft Corp. v. I4i Ltd. Partn., 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 335, 352 (2012). 
 80. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 51, at 1529-30. 
 81. See id. at 1530. 
 82. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 171, 179 (2008). 
 83. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) 
(2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2006)). 
 84. See Avery, supra note 82, at 175-76. 
 85. Colleen Kelly, Comment, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 417 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 418. 
 87. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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1.  Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
The FDA approval process for generic entry is greatly expedited by the 
ANDAs.88  Prior to Hatch-Waxman, generic firms had to submit lengthy pre-
clinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug's safety and efficacy to FDA, 
just as if they were applying for a New Drug Application (NDA) and the 
compound was coming onto the market for the very first time.89  After Hatch-
Waxman, the generic manufacturer need only show the FDA its data that the 
drug is “bioequivalent” to a previously approved compound.90  
When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it is also required to file a 
certification that, “in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his 
knowledge,” the generic drug does not infringe on any patent for that drug 
listed with the FDA.91  The generic manufacturer may meet this requirement 
by certifying one of four options with respect to the patent for the listed drug: 
“(I) that such patent information has not been filed, (II) that such patent has 
expired, (III) [by certifying] the date on which such patent will expire, or (IV) 
that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or 
sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.”92  A Paragraph 
IV certification constitutes a constructive act of patent infringement.93  Upon 
a Paragraph IV filing, the ANDA applicant must notify both the patent owner 
and the NDA holder of the certification, along with “a detailed statement of 
the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed.”94  A patent holder then has forty-five days 
after receiving notice of the Paragraph IV certification to file an infringement 
suit against the ANDA applicant or the ANDA will automatically be ap-
proved.95  However, if the patent holder brings an infringement action against 
the ANDA applicant within forty-five days, the FDA may not approve 
ANDA for another thirty months.96 
In a typical patent infringement case, a rival firm will spend substantial 
sums on the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of the potentially 
infringing product, and therefore must carefully consider the risks that these 
expenditures will be wasted, as well as the risk of incurring infringement 
damages.97  In Paragraph IV infringement, the generic firm has not yet in-
  
 88. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 426. 
 89. See id. at 423. 
 90. Id. 
 91. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 92. Id. 
 93. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 94. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). 
 95. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 96. Id. (providing that the court may increase or decrease the thirty-month period 
if either party “failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”). 
 97. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 
2006) (comparing Paragraph IV infringement with typical patent infringement cases 
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curred any of these manufacture, marketing, or distribution expenses.98  Fur-
ther, there are usually no infringement damages for the patent holder to re-
cover, so the generic entrant risks only litigation costs against the opportunity 
for future profits from selling the generic drug.99  The goal of this process is 
to resolve litigation before the generic hits the market so that these costs are 
avoided altogether.100  While this declaratory judgment provision is a useful 
tool in helping firms clarify and resolve “lurking legal issues,”101 the availa-
bility of Paragraph IV certification disproportionately benefits generic firms 
by providing a low risk and high reward method for infringing pharmaceuti-
cal patents.102  Some view this arrangement as embodying a congressional 
judgment in favor of litigated challenges, which is defeated by pay-for-delay 
settlements,103 while others feel the risk asymmetry created by this regulation 
necessitates the use of reverse payments in order to level the playing field.104 
2.  The 180-Day Exclusivity Bounty and the “Approval Bottleneck” 
The drafters of Hatch-Waxman were concerned that free-rider problems 
might give generic firms insufficient incentive to challenge the validity        
of patents.105  Generic firms would have inadequate incentive to incur litiga-
tion risks and expenses if other firms could simply free ride off a favorable 
judgment, thereby inviting competition into the market and eroding profits   
to the point that the original challenger might not recover its litigation 
costs.106  To remedy this problem, Hatch-Waxman establishes an additional 
  
and noting that “[b]y contrast, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patent holder ordi-
narily brings suit shortly after the paragraph IV ANDA has been filed – before the 
filer has spent substantial sums on the manufacturing, marketing, or distribution of the 
potentially infringing generic drug.  The prospective generic manufacturer therefore 
has relatively little to lose in litigation precipitated by a paragraph IV certification 
beyond litigation costs and the opportunity for future profits from selling the generic 
drug.  Conversely, there are no infringement damages for the patent holder to recover, 
and there is therefore little reason for it to pursue the litigation beyond the point at 
which it can assure itself that no infringement will occur in the first place.”). 
 98. Id. at 206. 
 99. Id. at 206-07. 
 100. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 424.  
 101. Ankur N. Patel, Comment, Delayed Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment 
on the Hatch-Waxman Act and the “Approval Bottleneck”, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1075, 1091 (2009). 
 102. See id. at 1096-97. 
 103. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1597. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 207. 
 105. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: 
Have They Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of 
U.S. Law and Observations for the Future, 39 IDEA 389, 423-24 (1999). 
 106. See id. at 423.  
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incentive for the first ANDA that contains a Paragraph IV certification.107  
This incentive comes in the form of a 180-day exclusivity period for the    
first Paragraph IV ANDA filer, during which the FDA will not approve any 
subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA until the earlier of: “(1) the date of the    
first commercial marketing of the drug under the first-to-file ANDA; or      
(2) the date a court holds the challenged patent(s) invalid or not infringed by 
the first ANDA applicant.”108  This essentially creates a duopoly in the mar-
ket for a particular drug for the period of the exclusivity, potentially worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars for a major drug.109  Whether this provision 
was necessary to motivate patent challenges presents an interesting ques-
tion,110 but this Comment will focus instead on the unintended consequences 
of the exclusivity provision.  
Prior to the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Modernization Act 
(MMA), a second generic company could not enter the market until the first 
ANDA filer had exhausted the 180-day exclusivity period.111  This meant that 
the first-to-file ANDA applicant could prevent all other generic competitors 
from entering the market by refraining from marketing the drug itself.112  The 
MMA corrected this explicit “statutory bottleneck” by providing that certain 
conduct would result in the first ANDA filer’s forfeiture of the exclusivity 
period.113  Such conduct included failure to market the generic114 and entering 
an agreement with another applicant, the listed drug application holder, or a 
patent owner.115  In addition, a subsequent ANDA applicant may file for a 
declaratory judgment that the relevant “patent is invalid or will not be in-
fringed by the drug for which the applicant seeks approval.”116  If the subse-
quent ANDA filer prevails in its declaratory action, the “failure to market” 
provision is triggered, thereby defeating what was previously a potentially 
  
 107. Patel, supra note 101, at 1082-83. 
 108. Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Note, Settlements Between Brand and Generic Phar-
maceutical Companies: A Reasonable Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1895 (2006). 
 109. Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1560. 
 110. See Engelberg, supra note 105, at 423-24 (noting that free rider problems  
are unlikely to occur when the Paragraph IV claim is noninfringment, that “the cost 
and risk of patent validity challenges turned out to be far less than expected, . . .   
[and] that potential profit from a successful challenge generally far exceeds the cost  
of litigation.”). 
 111. Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-
Name Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2005). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2006). 
 114. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I). 
 115. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V). 
 116. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II). 
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indefinite bottleneck for subsequent filers.117  Post MMA, it appears that the 
brand-name manufacturer’s ability to utilize the exclusivity period as an abso-
lute bar to subsequent generic entry has been corrected.118  
But overreliance on an explicit bottleneck to demonstrate feasibility of 
an anticompetitive settlement gives insufficient weight to the incentive effects 
of a generic’s eligibility for the exclusivity bounty. 119  The exclusivity period 
is not available to subsequent filers, even in the event of forfeiture by the first 
filer.120  Further, in order for a subsequent filer to force forfeiture under the 
“failure to market” provision, there must be “a nonappealable court decision 
that all of the patents, which the First Paragraph IV ANDA filer made a Para-
graph IV certification against, are invalid or not infringed.”121  This can come 
from a patent infringement suit involving any ANDA filer or a declaratory 
judgment action by any ANDA filer, but given the presence of a settlement, it 
will almost certainly have to come from the latter.122  The adequacy of the 
amendments to solve the problem of settlements excluding additional generic 
entry depends not only on whether it is possible for potential subsequent filers 
to get around the bottleneck, but whether it is plausible in light of their incen-
tives to litigate infringement.123  Many commentators believe that it is not.124  
Indeed, casual observation seems to support this concern. If subsequent entry 
were easy, then there would be an endless number of generic firms lining up 
to collect their settlement payments or, alternatively, choosing to litigate, thus 
subjecting the brand-name firm to the very same litigation risks it made the 
initial payments to avoid. Reverse payments, therefore, make very little sense 
to brand-name manufacturers unless the payments tend to exclude subsequent 
generics in some nontrivial way.  
  
 117. See Williams, supra note 111, at 60-61. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1588 (“The approval bottleneck is sufficient but 
not necessary to demonstrate the feasibility of pay-for-delay settlement or the pres-
ence of allocative harm.”). 
 120. Patel, supra note 101, at 1112. 
 121. Id. at 1100. 
 122. Id.  This is the most common situation where failure to market forfeiture will 
be triggered.  Other events include parties reaching a settlement which includes a 
judicial finding that all Paragraph IV certified patents, by the First Paragraph IV 
ANDA Filer, are invalid or not infringed, or the brand-name manufacturer removes 
from the Orange Book all patents subject to the Paragraph IV certification by the First 
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer.  Id. 
 123. See id. at 1101. 
 124. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1587. 
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III.  THE SPLIT: DISPARATE APPROACHES IN EVALUATING THE 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS  
Several policy tensions explain the disagreement amongst courts, com-
mentators and enforcement bodies over the appropriate antitrust treatment of 
pay-for-delay settlements.  The task has most commonly been characterized 
as ascertaining the appropriate boundaries between intellectual property law 
and antitrust law.125  Others have characterized the problem as determining 
the appropriate relationship between antitrust law and firm behavior within 
regulated industries.126  Analyses of pay-for-delay settlements also draw upon 
the general judicial preference for settlements,127 as well as the legislature’s 
encouragement of litigated patent challenges that arguably underlies the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.128  These policy tensions have resulted in a wide range 
of proposed approaches to determining the legality of pay-for-delay settle-
ments: per se illegality,129 traditional rule of reason analysis,130 quasi-per se 
illegality or “quick look” rule of reason analysis,131 and per se legality so long 
as the settlement restrains competition only within the apparent scope of the 
brand-name manufacturer’s patent.132 
A.  Per Se Illegality: The Sixth Circuit – In re Cardizem  
CD Antitrust Litigation 
The leading case giving pay-for-delay settlements per se treatment is the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.133  Card-
izem was the first time that a federal court of appeals considered the legality 
of a reverse settlement.134  The case involved a challenge to an agreement 
under which a brand-name firm, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (HMR), paid a 
generic company, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Andrx), quarterly payments 
to refrain from producing a generic version of the drug Cardizem CD,135 
  
 125. See Yvon, supra note 108, at 1886; Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, 
The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law: A Perspec-
tive on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 2 (2005). 
 126. See Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1556-57. 
 127. See supra Part III.A-D. 
 128. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 44, at 1605-06. 
 129. See infra Part III.A. 
 130. See infra Part III.D. 
 131. See infra Part III.C. 
 132. See infra Part III.B. 
 133. 332 F.3d 896, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 134. See Yvon, supra note 108, at 1899. 
 135. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d. at 900. 
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which is used to treat angina and hypertension and for the prevention of heart 
attacks and strokes.136   
The settlement agreement was struck nine days after the FDA           
gave partial approval to Andrx’s ANDA for marking a generic version of 
Cardizem,137 with full approval to be given upon the expiration of the       
thirty-month waiting period or upon a declaration of non-infringement in the 
Paragraph IV litigation.138  The agreement provided that Andrx would refrain 
from marketing a generic version of Cardizem CD in the United States until 
the earliest of: “(1) Andrx obtaining a favorable, final and nonappealable       
determination in the patent infringement case; (2) HMR and Andrx entering 
into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entering into a license agreement    
with a third party.”139  When the thirty-month waiting period expired in July 
of 1998, the FDA issued its final approval of Andrx's ANDA.140  In compli-
ance with the agreement, “HMR began making quarterly payments of $10 
million . . . , and Andrx did not bring its generic product to market.”141  The 
parties ultimately terminated the agreement, and Andrx began marketing a 
reformulated version of the generic in June of 1999.142  The generic sold for a 
much lower price than the patented Cardizem CD and has captured a substan-
tial portion of the market.143  
The plaintiffs in Cardizem alleged that but for the settlement agreement, 
Andrx would have marketed its generic version of Cardizem immediately 
upon the 1998 FDA approval and at a lower price than the patented Cardizem 
CD.144  Therefore, from the first FDA approval in July of 1998 through intro-
duction of the reformulated generic in 1999, the plaintiffs were deprived of 
the cost savings that generic competition in the market for Cardizem CD 
equivalent compounds would have brought consumers.145  The Sixth Circuit 
was persuaded that the settlement agreement was “at its core, a horizontal 
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD through-
out the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of 
trade.”146  The court rejected the HRM’s attempts to characterize the agree-
ment as “merely an attempt to enforce patent rights or an interim settlement 
of the patent litigation,” pointing out that “it is one thing to take advantage of 
a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to 
  
 136. Id. at 901. 
 137. Id. at 902. 
 138. Id. at 901. 
 139. Id. at 902. 
 140. Id. at 903. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 904. 
 145. See id. at 907. 
 146. Id. at 908. 
15
Owens: Owens: Cure for Collusive Settlements
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Owens – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on:  3/19/2014 4:53:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:49:00 PM 
1368 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78   
bolster the patent’s effectiveness.”147  The court also rejected HRM’s conten-
tion that the novelty of the legal issue presented should preclude per se treat-
ment, relying on Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,148 which held 
that that once a practice is determined to constitute horizontal price-fixing, 
antitrust law will not entertain any arguments that the practice is justified by 
the nature or particulars of the industry at issue.149 
The Cardizem decision is notable for its analysis of the approval        
bottleneck in deciding to condemn the settlement as a per se unlawful re-
straint on trade.150  The court found it particularly troubling that as part of the 
settlement agreement, Andrx agreed not to “relinquish or otherwise compro-
mise . . . [the] 180-day period of exclusivity.”151  The court observed, “[b]y 
delaying Andrx’s entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the entry 
of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of An-
drx’s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not 
to relinquish or transfer.”152  “By agreeing . . . not to end the underlying pa-
tent dispute and not to market a generic drug product in the relevant domestic 
market, [the settlement] effectively precluded” any commercial marketing of 
the generic.153  The settlement even contained an express provision that An-
drx could not relinquish or transfer its exclusivity.154  However, it is not clear 
the extent to which the settlement’s utilization of the statutory bottleneck was 
essential to the holding in Cardizem because settlement was struck prior to 
the implementation of the forfeiture provisions of the MMA.155 
  
 147. Id.  The court further noted that “[w]hen the Cardizem [district] court con-
demned the HMR/Andrx Agreement, it emphasized that the agreement [there] re-
strained Andrx from marketing other bioequivalent or generic versions of Cardizem 
that were not at issue in the pending litigation . . . .  Thus, the court found that the 
agreement’s restrictions extended to noninfringing and/or potentially noninfringing 
versions of generic Cardizem.”  Id. at 908 n.13 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlo-
ride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 148. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 149. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908-09; see also United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (discussing modern 
definition of horizontal price fixing and defining price fixing broadly as “[a]ny com-
bination which tampers with price structures,” and not just agreements that literally 
fix price). 
 150. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 907. 
 151. Id. at 902.  
 152. Id. at 907.  
 153. Id. at 907 n.12; see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 
F.Supp.2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing the process and distinguishing that case 
from the district court’s opinion in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 
2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000)). 
 154. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 907. 
 155. See id. at 896; see also Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Mod-
ernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-172, 117 Stat. 2066. 
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B. Scope of Patent Test  
1.  The Eleventh Circuit – Valley Drug, Schering-Plough, and Watson 
Prior to the Third Circuit’s ruling in K-Dur,156 the clear trend amongst 
courts was to apply a formal scope of patent test.157  Some commentators 
have also described this test as a straightforward rule of reason analysis, with 
the question of whether the settlement impermissibly expands the scope of 
the patent as a part of the rule of reason inquiry.158  Valley Drug Co. v. Gene-
va Pharmaceuticals, Inc.159 involved a civil antitrust challenge to two settle-
ment agreements: one between Abbott Labs (Abbot) and Geneva Pharmaceu-
ticals (Geneva), and another between Abbot and Zenith Goldline Pharmaceu-
ticals (Zenith).160 Abbott entered into “interim settlement” agreements with 
Zenith and Geneva during the course of patent litigation stemming from those 
companies’ Paragraph IV certifications with respect to Abbott’s patents for 
the drug Hytrin, used to treat hypertension and enlarged prostate condi-
tions.161  In the Zenith settlement, Zenith agreed not to sell or distribute any 
generic version of Hytrin until another firm introduced a generic Hytrin, or 
until Abbott's patent expired.162  Zenith further agreed not to sell or transfer 
its rights under any ANDA application relating to a Hyrin generic, including 
its right to the 180-day exclusivity period.163  In return, Abbott agreed to pay 
Zenith $3 million up front, another $3 million after three months, and $6 mil-
lion every three months thereafter until March 1, 2000, or until the agreement 
expired.164  The agreement allowed Abbot to continue its infringement litiga-
tion in the district court,165 and it provided that the payments would only ter-
minate if Abbot prevailed on appeal.166  Abbot eventually obtained a ruling of 
  
 156. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. 
Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
 157. See Yvon, supra note 108, at 1900-02 (discussing the Eastern District of 
New York’s decision in In re Ciprofloxcin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F. 
Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Cipro II”), and the Second Circuit’s decision in In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 1900. 
 159. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 160. Id. at 1295-96. 
 161. Id. at 1298-99. 
 162. Id. at 1300. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  The agreement also provided that “if another generic manufacturer intro-
duced a terazosin hydrochloride drug and obtained a 180-day exclusivity period, Ab-
bott’s payments would be halved until the period expired.”  Id. 
 165. See Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., Nos. 96-C-3331, 96-C-5868, & 97-
C-7587, 1998 WL 566884 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1998). 
 166. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th          
Cir. 2003). 
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invalidity “because the crystalline form of terazosin hydrochloride claimed in 
the patent was on sale in the United States more than one year before Abbott 
applied for the patent.”167  The district court in Valley Drug found this subse-
quent judgment of invalidity dispositive on the antitrust questions because it 
meant that Geneva never had any patent rights in the first place.168  In revers-
ing, the Eleventh Circuit held that a court “must judge the antitrust implica-
tions of a reverse payment settlement as of the time that the settlement was 
executed.”169  Moreover, at the time of the settlement, the patent conferred 
“potential exclusionary power” with respect to the generic, and this potential 
exclusionary power should be treated as equivalent to actual exclusionary 
power for antitrust purposes.170  The Eleventh Circuit articulated a highly 
deferential scope of patent test that considers “(1) the scope of the exclusion-
ary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that 
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”171   
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an 
FTC determination that the settlement between Schering-Plough (Schering) 
and Upsher-Smith Laboratories (Upsher) was an unlawful restraint on 
trade.172  The litigation resulted from Upsher’s submission of a Paragraph IV 
ANDA, which certified that Upsher’s proposed generic potassium-chloride 
compound, Klor Con M20 (Klor Con), did not infringe upon Schering’s pa-
tented K-Dur 20 compound.173  In 1997, Schering and Upsher began settle-
ment discussions, but Schering was reluctant to pay Upsher to stay out of the 
market.174  The parties eventually reached an agreement under which Upsher 
would delay entry until September 2001, and in exchange, Schering would 
enter into a separate agreement to license five of Upsher’s cholesterol prod-
ucts for “(1) $60 million in initial royalty fees; (2) $10 million in milestone 
royalty payments; and (3) 10% or 15% royalties on sales.”175  Schering also 
entered into a similar agreement in 1997 with Lederle, Inc. (ESI), another 
pharmaceutical manufacturer who sought FDA approval to market its own 
generic version of K-Dur 20 called “Micro-K 20.”176  The agreement divided 
  
 167. Id. at 1301. 
 168. Id. at 1306. 
 169. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306). 
 170. Id. (quoting Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311). 
 171. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312) (emphasis added). 
 172. 402 F.3d at 1063. 
 173. Id. at 1058, 1058 n.2.  Potassium chloride compounds are used to high blood 
pressure and congestive heart disease.  Id. at 1058.  Potassium chloride commonly 
used and is not patentable.  Id.  Schering’s K-Dur 20 formula includes a patented 
extended-release coating that surrounds the potassium chloride.  Id. 
 174. Id. at 1059. 
 175. Id. at 1059-60. 
 176. Id. at 1060-61. 
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the remaining patent life of K-Dur 20 and promised payments of $5-15 mil-
lion177 if ESI would wait until January of 2004 to enter the market.178  The 
FTC believed these royalty payments exceeded the true value of the license 
and were simply “reverse payments” in disguise.179  
The Eleventh Circuit adhered to the framework devised in Valley Drug, 
emphasizing that traditional antitrust was “ill-suited” for evaluating patent 
settlements because it seeks to “determine whether the challenged conduct 
had an anticompetitive effect on the market” and because “[b]y their nature, 
patents create an environment of exclusion, and . . . [t]he anticompetitive 
effect is already present.”180  While both cases utilize the same framework, it 
is useful to parse the court’s analysis in Schering-Plough because, while the 
Valley Drug decision resulted in remand for factual findings within the scope 
of patent analysis framework prescribed by the court of appeals,181 the court 
in Schering-Plough was able to make its own factual determinations in apply-
ing the test.182   
The court began by acknowledging the presumption of patent validity 
and noting that there was nothing in the record that would allow the court to 
depart from this presumption.183  The existence of a valid patent gave Scher-
ing the lawful right to exclude infringing products from the market and to 
license the patent.184  Absent any evidence to rebut the presumed legitimacy 
of the patent,185 Schering’s exclusionary conduct was a lawful means of ex-
cluding infringing conduct.186 
The court then applied the next prong of the test: whether the record 
supported a finding that the agreements restricted competition beyond the 
exclusionary effects of patent.187  The court defined the potential exclusionary 
scope of the K–Dur 20 patent as the right to exclude both of the generic com-
  
 177. Id.  Schering offered to pay $5 million, which it attributed to legal fees.  Id. 
at 1060.  When ESI insisted upon another $10 million, the parties devised a settlement 
whereby Schering would pay ESI up to $10 million if ESI received FDA approval by 
a certain date.  Id. at 1060-61. 
 178. Id. at 1060. 
 179. Id. at 1068. 
 180. Id. at 1065-66 (citation omitted).  
 181. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312-13 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 182. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062 (“We review the FTC’s findings of 
fact and economic conclusions under the substantial evidence standard.  The      
FTC’s findings of fact, ‘if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.’  This      
standard applies regardless whether the FTC agrees with the ALJ.  We may, however, 
examine the FTC’s findings more closely where they differ from those of the ALJ.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2000)). 
 183. See id. at 1066. 
 184. Id. at 1067. 
 185. Id. at 1068. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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panies from the K–Dur 20 market, and the “right to grant licenses, if it so 
chooses.”188  Because the agreement excluded generic competition against a 
compound apparently within the patent’s objective scope, and for a shorter 
period of time than the remaining patent term, the court concluded that the 
agreement did not impermissibly extend Schering's patent monopoly.189  The 
court then went on to describe that the agreements actually had a number of 
pro-competitive benefits.190  For example, the provision of the settlement 
under which Upsher’s licensed some of its own patents to Schering “may 
benefit the public by introducing a new rival into the market, facilitating 
competitive production, and encouraging further innovation.”191  The agree-
ment also allowed Upsher and ESI to enter the market prior to the expiration 
of Schering’s patent.192  The court concluded its analysis by considering the 
public policy arguments in favor of settling litigation and found that the bene-
fits of settlement outweighed any ancillary competitive restraints contained in 
the agreements.193 
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated its adherence to the scope of patent anal-
ysis in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.194  The case involved facts very 
similar to Valley-Drug.195  Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Watson) filed a 
Paragraph IV certified ANDA seeking approval to market a generic version 
of Solvay Pharmaceuticals’ (Solvay) patented AndroGel, a topical gel that 
treats the symptoms of low testosterone in men.196  Just prior to the district 
court’s ruling on Watson’s motion for summary judgment, the parties entered 
into a reverse payment agreement.197  Under the agreement, Watson would 
not market generic versions of AndroGel until August 31, 2015, unless an-
other manufacturer did so before then.198  In exchange, Solvay agreed to share 
some of its AndroGel profits with Watson, projecting payments of $19 mil-
lion and $30 million through 2015.199   
The core of the FTC’s argument was that Solvay probably would     
have lost the underlying patent infringement litigation,200 thus warranting 
heightened antitrust scrutiny of the settlement.201  The court adamantly reject-
  
 188. Id. at 1066-67. 
 189. Id. at 1076. 
 190. Id. at 1075. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1060. 
 193. Id. at 1075. 
 194. 677 F.3d 1298, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 195. Id. at 1306-07 (noting the similarity between the two cases). 
 196. Id. at 1303-04. 
 197. Id. at 1305. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1312.  The court also noted that “Watson agreed to promote branded 
AndroGel to urologists, and Par agreed to promote it to primary care doctors.  Par also 
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ed the “FTC's retrospective predict-the-likely-outcome-that-never-came ap-
proach.”202  Instead, the court emphasized that the high stakes and uncertain 
outcomes inherent in patent litigation,203 the difficulty in retroactively deter-
mining the parties’ probabilities of success at trial,204 and the burdens such an 
inquiry would impose on the courts counsel in favor of simply deferring to 
the formal scope of the patent.205  The court also felt that the risk of such 
agreements being used to prop up suspect patents was mitigated by the pres-
ence of numerous other generic firms not bound by the settlement agreement 
who could subsequently challenge the patent,206 indicating that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach relies to some extent on the notion that other generics are 
sufficiently able and motivated to pursue subsequent challenges.207  Indeed, 
even under its deferential test, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that reverse 
payments could violate antitrust laws if the terms of the agreement created a 
bottleneck that blocked other generic competition.208  Ultimately, the Watson 
decision tracked the analysis in Valley Drug and Schering-Plough and reaf-
firmed the highly deferential scope of patent test as the controlling liability 
rule in the Eleventh Circuit.209 
2.  Second Circuit - In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation 
The Second Circuit also opted to use a scope of patent analysis in decid-
ing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.210  Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, PLC, (ICI) obtained a patent for the breast cancer drug Tamoxifen, 
which went on to become the most prescribed cancer drug in the world.211  
Barr Labs (Barr) sought to manufacture a generic version of Tamoxifen and 
filed a Paragraph IV certified ANDA with the FDA in September of 1987.212  
  
agreed to serve as a backup manufacturer for branded AndroGel but assigned that part 
of the agreement to Paddock.”  Id. at 1305. 
 202. Id. at 1314. 
 203. Id. at 1313. 
 204. Id. at 1313-14. 
 205. Id. at 1312, 1314. 
 206. Id. at 1315. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that because the manufacturer had agreed “to refrain from ever marketing a 
generic” version of the patented drug, the settlement agreement blocked generic com-
petition after the patent expired, and in that way excluded competition beyond the 
scope of the patent) (emphasis added). 
 209. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312. 
 210. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 211. Id. at 193. 
 212. Id. (“On April 20, 1992, the district court (Vincent L. Broderick, Judge) 
declared ICI’s tamoxifen patent invalid based on the court’s conclusion that ICI had 
deliberately withheld ‘crucial information’ from the Patent and Trademark Office 
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Barr claimed that ICI’s Tamoxifen patent was invalid because ICI had with-
held “crucial information” regarding the safety and efficacy of the drug from 
the USPTO during the patent application process.213  The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with Barr in the 
infringement suit and declared ICI’s Tamoxifen patent invalid.214  ICI ap-
pealed the ruling to the Federal Circuit.215  While the appeal was pending, the 
parties entered into a settlement under which Zeneca (which had succeeded 
ICI’s ownership rights of the patent) would pay $21 million and grant Barr a 
non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen in the United 
States under Barr's label, rather than Zeneca's trademark Nolvadex.216 In ex-
change, Barr would change its ANDA from a Paragraph IV certification to a 
Paragraph III certification,217 thereby delaying entry until the expiration of 
Zeneca's patent in 2002.218 
The case is illustrative of the use of an implicit bottlenecking agreement 
to forestall other generic entry.219  As part of the settlement, Barr “under-
stood” that it was to prevent the subsequent generic manufacturers from pro-
ducing generic Tamoxifen by asserting the 180-day exclusivity right pos-
sessed by the first Paragraph IV filer.220  The parties’ efforts to bottleneck 
entry was aided by the invalidation of the FDA’s “successful defense” rule, 
which previously required that a generic entrant must successfully defend its 
Paragraph IV certification in the infringement litigation in order to obtain the 
180-day exclusivity right because a settlement would not have constituted a 
“successful defense.”221  The successful defense rule has since been struck 
  
regarding tests that it had conducted on laboratory animals with respect to the safety 
and effectiveness of the drug.  Those tests had revealed hormonal effects ‘opposite to 
those sought in humans,’ which, the court found, could have ‘unpredictable and at 
times disastrous consequences.’” (citations omitted)). 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Recall that a Paragraph III certification acknowledges the validity of the 
patent, and merely certifies “the date on which such patent will expire.” 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) (2006); see also supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
 218. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 194. 
 219. See id.  
 220. Id.  The 180-day exclusivity period would only commence when Barr begins 
marketing its own generic version of the drug.  Id.  Because Barr was able to market 
Zeneca’s version of tamoxifen pursuant to the settlement agreement, it had no incen-
tive to begin marketing until its own version (and thus trigger the exclusivity period) 
until after the settlement expired.  See id. 
 221. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 130-32 (D.D.C. 1997); 
see also Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889, Nos. 97-1973, 97-1874, 1998 WL 
153410, at *7 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998). 
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down.222  Though challenged, Barr’s exclusivity rights ultimately helped the 
settlement agreement effectively forestall all generic entry until the expiration 
of Zeneca’s Tamoxifen patent in August of 2002.223 
A class of consumers and consumer groups challenged the legality of 
the 1993 settlement between Zeneca and Barr on antitrust grounds,224 alleging 
that the reverse payment enabled Zeneca and Barr “to circumvent the district 
court’s invalidation of Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent . . . , which . . . would have 
been affirmed” on appeal.225  The district court granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss, emphasizing that: (1) although a patent holder is “prohibited 
from acting in bad faith ‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly’ to restrain 
or monopolize trade,” a patent holder is permitted to enter into a licensing 
agreement with the alleged infringer without violating the Sherman Act, (2) 
defendants could not be held liable for Barr's assertion of the 180-day exclu-
sivity period to block additional generic entry even if this was an express 
term of the settlement because the “successful defense” rule was still valid in 
1993 when the settlement was struck, and (3) while the vacatur of initial rul-
  
 222. Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1076 (“We find that the FDA exceeded its 
statutory authority in imposing the successful-defense requirement as a prerequisite to 
the invocation of the 180–day exclusivity rule by a first applicant under section 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv).”). 
 223. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 196.  
Because of the rule change, however, the FDA was able to, and on March 2, 
1999, did, grant Barr’s petition to confirm its entitlement to the exclusivity pe-
riod despite the fact that it had settled, rather than “successfully defended” 
against, Zeneca’s lawsuit. . . .  Pharmachemie and Mylan challenged the 
FDA’s decision.  On March 31, 2000, in Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in Pharmachemie’s and 
Mylan’s favor.  It concluded that, although Judge Broderick’s ruling of inva-
lidity in Tamoxifen I had been vacated by the Settlement Agreement, that rul-
ing was still a court decision sufficient to trigger Barr’s 180-day exclusivity 
period, which therefore had already expired. . . .  On appeal, however, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit vacated the district court’s decision as moot.  The 
court noted that subsequent to the FDA’s decision to approve Barr’s applica-
tion, the district court had ruled against Pharmachemie in Zeneca’s patent in-
fringement lawsuit against it.  Thus, even if, as the district court held in 
Mylan, Barr’s 180-day exclusivity period had run, Pharmachemie and Mylan 
were prohibited by the judgments against them in the patent litigation from 
marketing their generic versions of tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent expired.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 224. See id.  Plantiffs alleged a number of antitrust violations, including:  
[T]he Settlement Agreement unlawfully (1) enabled Zeneca and Barr to resus-
citate a patent that the district court had already held to be invalid and unen-
forceable; (2) facilitated Zeneca’s continuing monopolization of the market 
for tamoxifen; (3) provided for the sharing of unlawful monopoly profits be-
tween Zeneca and Barr; (4) maintained an artificially high price for tamoxifen; 
and (5) prevented competition from other generic manufacturers of tamoxifen.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. at 197. 
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ing of invalidity deprived future generic filers of collaterally estopping 
Zeneca’s claims of patent validity, thereby forcing future generic entrants to 
litigate the validity of the patent, such inconvenience did not constitute an 
“injury to competition” recognized under antitrust laws.226 
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected a per se rule in evaluating patent 
infringement settlements involving reverse payments.227  Consistent with the 
Eleventh Circuit, the test employed by the Second Circuit is whether the “ex-
clusionary effects of the agreement exceed the scope of the patents.”228  The 
Second Circuit also declined to consider the likelihood of the patentee’s suc-
cess at trial.229  This insistence again came despite that fact the present set-
tlement was struck during the appeal of a finding of patent invalidity, an ap-
peal which would have proceeded with considerable deference to the district 
court’s initial holding.230  The Second Circuit found the mere fact that “appel-
lants prevail with some frequency” was sufficient to adhere to the general rule 
that courts should refrain from guessing at what another court would have 
held.231  The court further declined to consider the size of the reverse payment 
in its analysis.232  The decision tracked the analysis in In re Ciprofloxacin,233 
so it appears that rule of reason is the law in the Second Circuit for evaluating 
reverse payment settlements.234 
3.  The Federal Circuit – In re Ciprofloxacin  
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 
The Federal Circuit applied the scope of the patent test in In re     
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation stating, “The essence of the 
inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusion-
ary zone of the patent.”235  The court further “agree[d] with the Second and 
  
 226. Id. at 197-98. 
 227. Id. at 198, 206. 
 228. Id. at 213 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 
(11th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229. Id. at 204. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  The court also noted that federal district courts concluding in later law-
suits seeking to enforce the Tamoxifen patent that the patent was, in fact, valid pro-
vided additional reason not to inquire into the chances that the patent would or would 
not have been invalidated.  Id. (“While we do not think that these results enable us to 
estimate the chances that the Federal Circuit would have reversed the judgment of the 
district court in Tamoxifen I, they at least suggest the extent to which the outcome of 
such proceedings may be unpredictable.”). 
 232. See id. at 208-13. 
 233. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 234. See Yvon, supra note 108, at 1902. 
 235. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1336. 
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Eleventh Circuits . . . that, in the absence of evidence of fraud . . .           or 
sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the 
antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”236  
Judge Posner gives the following example of what is meant by a “sham”  
patent litigation:  
Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost certainly inva-
lid (that is, almost certain not to survive a judicial challenge), sues its 
competitors, and settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in 
exchange for their agreeing not to sell the patented product for less 
than the price specified in the license.  In such a case, the patent, the 
suit, and the settlement would be devices – masks – for fixing prices, 
in violation of antitrust law.237 
C.  Quasi Per Se or “Quick Look” Analysis –  
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation 
The Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation238 re-
jected the trend toward the scope of patent test, creating a circuit split regard-
ing the legality of reverse payments in patent settlements.239  In its place, the 
Third Circuit devised a “quick look” rule of reason analysis under which re-
verse payments in exchange for delayed market entry are prima facie evi-
dence of an unreasonable restraint on trade.240  Defendants may rebut this 
presumption of illegality by showing that the agreement “(1) was for a pur-
pose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”241  
The case arose out of the same settlements as the agreement as Schering.242 
The Third Circuit identified three problems with the scope of patent 
test.243  First, the court took issue with effectively irrebuttable presumption of 
patent validity, arguing that the scope of patent test inappropriately regarded 
the presumption of patent validity as a substantive right rather than a proce-
dural device.244  The court cited empirical data that showed that the generic 
challenger prevailed 73% of the time in Paragraph IV litigation from 1983 to 
  
 236. Id. 
 237. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 
(N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 238. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 239. See id. at 218. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 211; see supra notes 171-179 and accompanying text. 
 243. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 214. 
 244. Id. at 214 (“While persons challenging the validity of a patent in litigation 
bear the burden of defeating a presumption of validity, this presumption is intended 
merely as a procedural device and is not a substantive right of the patent holder.”). 
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1999.245  Second, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit in Watson, the court doubt-
ed the assumption that “subsequent challenges by other generic manufactur-
ers will suffice to eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse pay-
ment to the initial challenger”246 because the 180–day exclusivity bounty was 
only available to the initial Paragraph IV filer.247  The court worried that pay-
for-delay agreements will therefore eliminate the most motivated generic 
challenger.248  The court also noted that the monopoly over the drug at issue 
is often valuable enough to justify reverse payments to keep out multiple 
challengers.249  Finally, the court relied on a series of Supreme Court cases 
that emphasized the strong policy interest in ensuring that the free exploita-
tion of ideas is not repressed by invalid patents.250   
D.  The Supreme Court – FTC v. Actavis 
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in June of 2013 in FTC v. 
Actavis, holding 5-3 that antitrust challenges to reverse settlements should be 
evaluated under a rule of reason standard.251  In doing so, the court rejected 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in FTC v. Watson, that as long as the anticom-
petitive effects of a settlement fell within the objective scope of the patent, 
the settlement was immune from antitrust challenge.252  
The Supreme Court questioned whether the presumption of patent valid-
ity should hold as much weight as it does under the scope of patent test.253  
“[T]o refer, as the [Eleventh] Circuit referred, simply to what the holder of a 
valid patent could do does not by itself answer the antitrust question. The 
patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.”254  
Because the settlement ends the litigation that would determine the validity of 
the patent, the legality of the settlement may not be determined solely on 
what constitutes appropriate exclusion for a holder of a valid patent.255  As a 
result, the Court required legality of the settlement to be determined by “tra-
ditional antitrust factors.”256  The Court found additional support for its posi-
  
 245. Id. (citing FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 16 
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrug study.pdf; Kimberly 
A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000)). 
 246. Id. at 215. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 215-16. 
 251. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (2013). 
 252. Id. at 2227. 
 253. Id. at 2230-31. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 2231. 
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tion in the “general procompetitive thrust” of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
contains specific provisions for facilitating challenges to patent validity.257 
The Court also found that the general judicial policy of favoring settle-
ment was insufficient to warrant complete abandonment of antitrust limita-
tions on settlements.258  The Court identified five factors that weighed in fa-
vor of permitting antitrust challenges: these settlements have the potential for 
“genuine adverse effects on competition”;259 the anticompetitive effects will 
at least sometimes be unjustified;260 the patentee has the power to bring about 
these anticompetitive effects;261 antitrust action against these settlements is 
feasible;262 and the risk of antitrust liability does not preclude the possibility 
of settlement.263 
The Court also declined to adopt a “quick-look” rule of reason approach 
adopted by the Third Circuit and advocated by the FTC.264  The Court be-
lieved that the anticompetitive effects of these settlements were far too de-
pendent on particular circumstances of each case to justify a presumption of 
anticompetitiveness.265  The Court did acknowledge that “[t]here is always 
something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, and as such the 
quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.”266  However, 
the decision did not go as far as to discuss what this inquiry would be, and the 
Court instead left to lower courts the task of structuring the appropriate rule 
of reason inquiry for these cases.267  This leaves considerable uncertainty 
regarding how the antitrust analysis will proceed.   This uncertainty will cre-
ate an environment where courts and firms are likely to commit costly errors 
when making and reviewing settlements that include reverse payments. 
IV.  DEVELOPING AN OPTIMAL LIABILITY RULE 
A.  Decision Theory: Basic Insights 
Antitrust doctrine has consciously evolved in accordance with develop-
ments in economic thinking about the competitive effects of certain business 
  
 257. Id. at 2234. 
 258. Id. at 2235. 
 259. Id. at 2234. 
 260. Id. at 2235-36. 
 261. Id. at 2226. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 2237. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 2237-38 (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756, 780 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267. Id. at 2238. 
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practices.268  More recently, the idea of incorporating a branch of economic 
analysis called “decision theory” to evaluate the rules and processes for mak-
ing antitrust liability determinations has gained favor.269  The basic proposi-
tion is this: when devising and applying legal rules, courts and other lawmak-
ing bodies must make a determination about the underlying factual realties in 
the realm they seek to regulate.270  In a world of perfect information, whether 
a certain activity should be permitted or enjoined would depend on a straight-
forward application of appropriate law to the facts of a given case.271  Of 
course, courts do not operate in a world of perfect information, and instead 
operate in a reality where crucial facts may be costly or unattainable.272  In 
light of this uncertainty, courts must form presumptions, impose burdens of 
proof, collect and process information, make relevant findings of fact, and 
apply the relevant legal standards to those findings.273  The process of obtain-
ing and deliberating upon the information upon the information necessary to 
make liability determinations is called “decision costs”274 and will be the first 
cost considered in this analysis.  The more intensive the process of gathering 
and using additional information, the more likely a court can reach a correct 
liability determination.275  The desirability of discovering additional infor-
  
 268. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
878 (2007) (finding that the “economics literature is replete with procompetitive justi-
fications for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance, and the few recent 
studies on the subject also cast doubt on the conclusion that the practice meets the 
criteria for a per se rule.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 575 (1986) (drawing upon emerging consensus in the economics field 
regarding the implausibility of predatory pricing schemes to constrain the action). 
 269. See C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Anti-
trust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41-42 (1999). 
 270. See id. at 43. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. 
 273. Judge Marshall gives the following justification of per se rules under this 
framework:  
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness.  They are justified on the 
assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the 
losses and that the significant administrative advantages will result.  In other 
words, the potential competitive harms plus the administrative costs of deter-
mining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must far out-
weigh the benefits that may result.  If the potential benefits in the aggregate 
are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in 
individual cases.   
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 274. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 871, 877 (2011). 
 275. See Beckner, supra note 269, at 46. 
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mation then depends on the costs of obtaining that information relative to the 
benefits of considering it.276 
In addition to the costs of adjudication under a given liability rule, deci-
sion theory also considers the costs of erroneous decisions (“error costs”).277  
Some errors are inevitable given the court’s task of resolving complex issues 
based on imperfect information.278  These errors come in two forms.  First, 
courts may wrongly convict beneficial practices (also termed “false positives” 
or “Type I errors”).279  Alternately, courts may wrongly acquit harmful prac-
tices (also termed “false negatives” or “Type II errors”).280  In devising opti-
mal decision rules, courts must consider the relative frequencies with which a 
given liability regime will tend to generate Type I and Type II errors.281  The 
total error costs of a liability regime equals the magnitude of loss occasioned 
by each respective error type weighted by the probability that the regime 
tends to produce each type of error.282  The costs of a liability rule that tends 
to generate Type I errors are “not just the costs associated with the parties 
before the court (or agency), but also the loss of procompetitive conduct by 
other actors that, . . . are deterred from undertaking such conduct by a fear of 
litigation.”283  Likewise, the cost of a regime that generates a high number of 
Type II errors is not only the cost of failure to enjoin anticompetitive behav-
ior in the case at bar but also the cost of inadequately deterring future anti-
competitive behavior of nonparties whose behavior will be influenced by 
litigation risks.284   
Given these considerations, the framework posits that an optimal rule is 
one that minimizes the sum of decision and error costs.285  The general 
framework can be expressed as: 
∑[decision Costs + Prob (Type I) x Magn (Type I) + Prob (Type II)  
x Magn (Type II)]286 
In the context of reverse payments, appropriate antitrust rules should 
minimize sum of the probability weighted sum of the costs associated with 
  
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. at 45. 
 279. See Lambert, supra note 2745, at 878. 
 280. See id. 
 281. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 16 (2008) [hereinafter D.O.J. 
REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.  
 282. See Beckner supra note 269, at 45. 
 283. D.O.J. REPORT, supra note 281, at 16. 
 284. See id. at 162. 
 285. See Beckner, supra note 269, at 61. 
 286. See id. at 41. 
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condemning unlawful exclusion, acquitting lawful exclusion, and the cost of 
determining the lawfulness of the patent holder’s exclusionary conduct. 
B. Caveat – Amenability of the Pay-for-Delay                                    
Problem to Decision Theory Analysis 
There may be some doubt about whether the question of the appropriate 
liability rule for patent settlements involving reverse payments is even an 
appropriate candidate for decision theoretic analysis.287  On one hand, the 
disagreement is fundamentally about how to make a liability decision in the 
absence critical information, namely, whether the generic compound in fact 
infringes on a valid patent.288  Knowledge that the underlying patent is not 
valid or is not infringed would render the agreements unlawful horizontal 
market allocations,289 while knowledge that the underlying patent is valid and 
infringed would render the settlements lawful.290  Disagreement exists about 
what the appropriate presumptions are in a world where this decisive infor-
mation is costly to obtain.291 
On the other hand, the often-divergent goals promoted by patent law and 
antitrust law292 create a sort of apples-to-oranges comparison that may render 
the issue of reverse settlements resistant to decision theoretic analysis.  If this 
issue presented questions of pure of antitrust law, then the effects of a given 
liability rule could be measured against a single benchmark – i.e., whether the 
rule, accounting for decision and error costs, tends to increase or decrease 
output in the relevant market.293  Because both erroneous and proper en-
forcements of patent rights will result in short-term price increases and output 
restrictions that are inconsistent antitrust goals, an output-focused analysis 
would necessarily overemphasize the antitrust goals and undervalue the inno-
vation incentives encouraged by patent rights.  But ultimately, even though 
this problem prevents the analysis from being as quantitatively rigorous as we 
would like, it is still useful to estimate the relative likelihood of false posi-
tives and false negatives under competing liability rules, cost of each error, 
and the administrative costs of sorting one from the other.  
  
 287. See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework 
for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 37 (2009). 
 288. See id. at 73. 
 289. See id. at 72. 
 290. See id. 
 291. See Beckner, supra note 269, at 41-42. 
 292. See supra Part II; see also Carrier, supra note 287, at 73. 
 293. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND 
EXECUTION 2-5 (2005) (justifiying equating effects on competition with output). 
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C.  Decision Costs: The Costs of Determining                                 
Underlying Infringement 
The cost of obtaining information is a key component which factors into 
the overall costs of a given liability rule.294  In the case of reverse patent set-
tlements, the validly of such settlement will turn on whether the generic com-
pound actually infringes on a valid patent held by the brand-name manufac-
turer.295  The main justification for permitting these agreements rests on the 
judicial policy favoring settlement as a way to avoid the costs associated with 
discovering the information necessary to determine infringement in a fully 
litigated case.296  Indeed, settlements have particular appeal in patent in-
fringement litigation, as the costs of fully litigating a high stakes infringement 
case can range from three to ten million dollars.297  The upper bound of an 
estimate of decision costs averted by a regime that permits reverse payments 
will therefore be the total cost of infringement litigation times the number of 
infringement cases that would have been fully litigated but for the availability 
or reverse payments to settle the litigation. 
The amount of litigation expense actually saved in the event of settle-
ment will almost certainly be less, and maybe considerably so.  For one, the 
settlements are frequently struck at late stages of the infringement litigation, 
after some portion of litigation expenses are already incurred.298  There is also 
reason to believe that the net decision costs saved by permitting reverse pay-
ments will not be that great compared to a regime that prohibits reverse pay-
ments. First, a scope of patent regime would inevitably retain some potential 
for an antitrust challenge to the legality of the settlement, such as whether the 
settlement unlawfully expands even the presumed formal scope of the patent, 
whether the underlying infringement litigation was fraudulent or a sham, or 
by considering the strength of the underlying patent as part of the antitrust 
inquiry.299  Under a per se rule, costs of prosecuting and defending subse-
quent antitrust suits likely vanish because firms would respond to the prohibi-
  
 294. See Beckner, supra note 269, at 45-46. 
 295. See FTC v. Watson, 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 296. See id. at 1314. 
 297. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
2007 25 (2007).  In 2007, in patent cases with more than $25 million at risk,          
each party faced a median expense of $5 million.  Id.; see also AM. INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 29 (2009) (reporting that 
patent litigation suits with over $1 million at stake cost roughly between $3 million 
and $6 million). 
 298. See, e.g., Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305 (noting that Watson’s and Par/Paddock 
settled the case just prior to the district court deciding motions for summary judg-
ment); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting that Zenecca and Barr reached settlement after a full trial in the district court 
and during the pendency of an appeal.). 
 299. See supra Parts III.B, III.C. 
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tion by not entering such settlements.300  Generic firms might also be more 
judicious in initiating Paragraph IV litigation in the first place because they 
could no longer expect to be bought off with a generous settlement.301  Final-
ly, it is not obvious that prohibiting reverse payments would take settlements 
off the table.302  Many settlements of Paragraph IV litigation do not require 
reverse payments, meaning that litigation costs can still be avoided under less 
problematic agreements.303  
D.  Probability of a Type II Error is High  
Under the Scope of Patent Test 
The definition of a Type II error in the pay-for-delay context differs 
slightly from existing antirust commentary utilizing a decision theoretic 
framework. Generally, this framework is employed to analyze practices 
which have ambiguous effects on competition.304  This is not the case for 
reverse payments, which are universally understood to have anticompetitive 
effects, and are rescued only by the presence of a presumptively valid pa-
tent.305  Therefore, the a Type II decision error arises when a patentee is per-
mitted to exclude a generic entrant from the market, even though the underly-
ing patent at issue is in fact invalid or not infringed.  
The tendency to produce a high number of Type II errors is the single 
most concerning feature of the scope of patent test and regimes that are high-
ly deferential to settlement decisions of the parties.  This tendency can be 
explained by the way that parties’ settlement incentives in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation differs from those faced by adversaries in typical litigation set-
tings.306  In a settlement where plaintiff and defendant are aligned as adver-
saries, the parties’ willingness to settle will mainly depend upon their confi-
dence in prevailing at litigation.307  For example, if $10 million in damages is 
  
 300. See supra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 301. See Ian Hastings, Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency in Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlements, 13 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 31, 54 (2011) (“This is the rent that Lemley and 
Hemphill identified as being sought by generic challengers, and the reason why chal-
lenges are so common.  A generic need not win a patent invalidity case; it need only 
challenge and thereafter manipulate the brand-name manufacturer into parting with 
some of its monopoly profits or allowing it to enter the market sooner than it would 
under litigation.”). 
 302. See FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY 4 (2010). 
 303. See infra Part IV.H. 
 304. See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Paul Bailin, A Reverse Perspective on Reverse Payment Settlements 17 
(May 2010) (unpublished student paper), available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:8965635. 
 307. See id. 
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at stake in the litigation, and the alleged infringing party believes there a 90% 
chance that it will be found to have infringed at trial, then the rational alleged 
infringer will typically be willing to pay up to $9 million to settle the litiga-
tion.  If the alleged infringer believes that there is only a 10% chance it will 
be found to have infringed at trial, then it will only be willing to pay up to $1 
million to settle the litigation.  This is not the case in Hatch-Waxman litiga-
tion, where the parties’ incentives are aligned toward settlement regardless of 
the merits of the underlying infringement claim:  
[C]onsider a traditional patent infringement settlement, one where the 
patent holder (PH) has lost, say, $10 million in profits during a year 
(Y1) in which the infringing manufacturer (IM) was on the market.  
When negotiating a settlement under which IM will agree to leave the 
market and pay damages to compensate PH for part of its loss, the in-
terests of the two parties are fully opposed.  IM has no future market 
prospects (at least until PH’s patent expires), and so it can “win” only 
by having to pay less of the $10 million in compensation to PH.  Im-
portantly, in this scenario, consumers have already derived some bene-
fit from the year’s worth of competition during Y1.  The parties are 
now left to divvy up what was left of the Y1 market after purchasers 
took the consumer surplus in the form of reduced prices.  That is, the 
potential settlement pie to be divided by the parties, based on their ex-
pected outcomes at litigation, is what is left after consumers have 
gained some economic benefit from competition.  Consumers are not 
players in this zero-sum game.308 
Hatch-Waxman litigation results from a constructive infringement – the mere 
filing of a Paragraph IV certified ANDA.309  The patent holder has not expe-
rienced any actual losses due to the marketing of an infringing compound; 
consequently, there is no set sum of damages at stake in the litigation.310  The 
size of settlement is instead constrained only by the patent holder’s expected 
profits from selling the drug as a monopolist.311  Because the brand-name 
drug maker’s profits selling as a monopolist will be greater than the sum of 
two firms’ profits selling in a market with generic competition,312 each party 
is made better off by excluding generic entry and splitting the monopoly prof-
its.313  For this reason, the generic challenger will frequently gain more 
  
 308. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 309. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
 310. See Bailin, supra note 306, at 22. 
 311. See id. 
 312. This is often true even accounting for the generic’s 180 duopoly bounty.  See 
Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
283, 298 (2012). 
 313. See Carrier, supra note 287, at 73. 
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through settlement than by prevailing in the infringement litigation.314  Con-
sider the following scenario:  
PH has been charging a monopoly price of $100 for a pill which costs 
$10 to produce, based on a patent set to expire in five years.  If IM 
were to put a generic version on the market, and other generics were to 
follow, assume the price would drop to $12 per pill.  Here, a PFD 
agreement might entail IM agreeing to stay off the market for three 
years, in exchange for PH paying it $15 per pill for 70 percent of PH’s 
sales volume (assume that this would be IM’s expected market share 
in a competitive market).  PH continues to receive a monopoly price 
of $85 on those sales during the three year period of market exclusivi-
ty, earning a per-pill profit of $75, and PH receives $15 per pill for do-
ing absolutely nothing, versus a $2 profit if it were to actually com-
mercialize its drug.315 
The presence of such incentives means that the parties will choose to settle 
irrespective of the validity of the underlying patent and their expectations of 
success at litigation.316  That the crucial piece of information which should 
determine the legality of an exclusionary settlement plays little or no role in 
the parties’ decision to reach such a settlement is extremely problematic.  
The scope of patent test might make sense if the generic entrant’s ex-
pected gains from prevailing in the infringement litigation exceeded the pa-
tent holder’s willingness to pay for exclusion.317  If this were the case, the 
parties would be positioned as adversaries, and if a settlement were struck, 
the terms would take into account each party’s perceived likelihood prevail-
ing in infringement litigation.318  Because the parties’ willingness to settle 
would be determined by their assessments of the validity of the underlying 
patent, a liability rule that defers to the parties decision to settle would not, on 
average, tend to produce settlements that restrain competition when the patent 
would have otherwise been invalidated.319  Unfortunately these conditions, 
which would require joint profits to be higher with entry than without, can 
only exist if the patent holder lacks market power.320  This is highly unlikely 
in the case of the patent holder for a blockbuster drug.321  Further, it would 
not be rational for a patent holder to make a reverse payment if it did not be-
  
 314. See Bailin, supra note 306, at 22. 
 315. Id. at 23. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 312, at 315. 
 318. See Bailin, supra note 306, at 22. 
 319. See id. at 23. 
 320. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 312, at 310. 
 321. See id. 
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lieve it had market power that would be threatened by generic entry.322  If it 
were the case that entry would increase joint profits, then settlement payment 
would flow in the usual direction, with the generic entrant making payment to 
the patent holder to drop its infringement challenge.323  Thus, the presence of 
a reverse payment confirms that the general conditions exist such that the 
joint profits of monopoly are higher than in duopoly, higher in duopoly than 
in triopoly, and so forth.324  As a result, the incentives of brand-name and 
generic manufacturers are strongly aligned to preclude discovery of the un-
derlying fact of patent validity or infringement that should determine the le-
gality of these settlements.   
Much of the defense of these settlements rest on the notion that the en-
hancement to innovation incentives that patent policy seeks to protect is un-
  
 322. See id. at 310-11 (“[T]he patent holder’s willingness to make a reverse pay-
ment that exceeds its anticipated litigation costs necessarily means that it believes it 
has market power.”). 
 323. See id. at app. A.  Elhauge and Krueger discussed reverse payment:  
Proof That Reverse Payments Cannot Be Necessary for Settlement If Joint 
Profits with Entry Exceed the Patent Holder's Profits Without Entry 
 
Weak Patent 
Tmax = θE (1- L) + [θEL(PN - PY) + CE + R]/E 
Tmin = θP - (CP+ R)/(PN - PY) 
The parties can settle only if Tmax > Tmin 
θE(1- L) + [θEL(PN - PY) + CE+ R]/E > θP - (CP + R)/(PN - PY) 
  
    Thus, if R increases by org] from 0 or any positive number, the left         
side (Tmax) will increase by ə/E and the right side (Tmin) will increase by ə/  
(PN - PY). 
 Therefore, if PN - PY < E (just PN < PY + E rearranged) then ə/E < -/ (PN - 
PY), meaning that increasing a settlement payment by org] can only make it 
less likely that Tmax > Tmin.  A corollary is that that if PN - PY< E but the par-
ties nevertheless settled, the parties must have necessarily been able to settle 
without any reverse payment. 
 
Strong Patent 
Tmax = θE + L(1- θE) + (CE + R)/E 
Tmin = θP + L(1- θP) - (CP+ R)/(PN - PY) 
 
 Increasing R by org] from 0 or any positive number can only reduce Tmax - 
Tmin if PN - PY< E because then Tmax would increase by only θ/E and Tmin 
would increase by the greater ə/(PN - PY).  Therefore, if PN - PY< E but the 
parties nevertheless settled, the parties must have necessarily been able to set-
tle without any reverse payment.   
Id. 
 324. See id. at 298 (citing Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and 
Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 977, 984 (1991); Richard G. 
Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 84 (1997); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Gener-
ic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 43 (2005)). 
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deterred if a patentee is deprived of this method to protect its patent rights.325  
However, there are nonobvious effects that also must be considered in as-
sessing the net effect on innovation incentives.326  Elhauge and Kreuger 
demonstrate that the availability of these settlements creates a legal regime 
that is much more likely to over reward pseudo-innovation, thereby threaten-
ing the promotion of genuine innovation.327 
[S]ettlements that exclude entry increase patent-holder profits more 
for weaker patents than for stronger patents.  For example, the holder 
of a weak patent that is only 5% likely to be deemed a valid innova-
tion could use such a settlement to secure exclusion throughout the en-
tire patent term, even though its patent is 95% likely to be deemed a 
non- innovation, while the holder of an ironclad patent that is 100% 
likely to be deemed a true innovation could not increase its exclusion 
period through settlement because it would already expect 100% ex-
clusion from litigation.328 
The net reward for pseudo-innovation becomes greater relative to the          
net reward for genuine innovations because genuine innovation is harder, 
more costly, or less certain than pseudo-innovation. 329  This can cause a re-
duction in the rate of true innovation.330  Indeed, many commentators have           
criticized the prevailing business practices in the pharmaceutical industry    
on precisely these grounds.331  This has obvious implications with regard to 
undermining the innovation promoting goals underlying patent policy.  For 
the present analysis, these observations lend empirical support to the notion     
that the availability of reverse settlements will tend to incentivize firms to 
produce a larger number of weaker patents,332 which, combined with the re-
duced incentive of generic rivals to police weak patents,333 will tend to pro-
duce Type II errors.  As a result, the number of objectively invalid patents 
remains intact because the number of reverse settlements will be high, and 
  
 325. See id. at 294. 
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See id. 
 330. See id. 
 331. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW 
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005) (arguing that pharmaceutical 
companies overinvest resources in extending patent monopolies of non-innovative 
compounds and marketing them as therapeutic advances); Donald W. Light & Joel R. 
Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research and Development: What Do We Get for All That 
Money? 2012 BRIT. J. MED. 345:e4348 (2012) (noting that revenues within the phar-
maceutical industry have outpaced research and development costs by a factor of six). 
 332. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 3123, at 295. 
 333. See Carrier, supra note 2878, at 73. 
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consumers will suffer the resulting higher costs and lower output.334  Empiri-
cal data appears to confirm the notion that fewer fully litigated infringement 
cases will result in greater market exclusion than would have resulted had the 
cases not settled.335  Therefore, if the brand-name and generic parties are left 
to act on their mutual incentive to allocate the market regardless of whether it 
was likely to be deemed lawful under the patent, the unlawful allocation of 
pharmaceutical markets is likely to be erroneously acquitted in a large num-
ber of instances.  
E.  Probability of Type I Errors 
An erroneous decision regarding the antitrust liability of parties using 
reverse payments will result in Type I errors when it falsely convicts innocent 
conduct (i.e., convicts a settlement in which a potential generic entrant is 
excluded no more than the extent to which is lawfully permitted by virtue of a 
valid patent). In such cases, had the Paragraph IV infringement litigation 
reached conclusion, a finding of patent validity and infringement would have 
resulted in an equal or greater exclusionary effect than the terms of the re-
verse payment agreement, and the costs of litigation would have been in-
curred without any offsetting gains to consumer access. Alternately, parties 
could be subjected to treble damages simply for having guessed wrong about 
what a court later determines about the scope and validity of the patent.336  
But while permitting reverse payments will result in a high frequency of Type 
II errors,337 the converse is also true: prohibiting these settlements will result 
in some instances of Type I errors where patent holders will not be able to 
exclude rivals even when they should. 
The literature advocating lenient antitrust treatment of reverse payments 
is replete with concerns over the competency of courts to correctly adjudicate 
patent rights.338  A fair assessment must acknowledge that the objective exist-
  
 334. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 3123, at 294. 
 335. For example, the FTC found that between 1992 and 2002, generic           
entrants prevailed in seventy-three percent of Paragraph IV litigation that was litigat-
ed to judgment. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY viii (2002), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/2002/ 07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.  
 336. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“Patent litigation is too complex and the results too uncertain for parties to 
accurately forecast whether enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will 
expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were destroyed by the mere 
invalidity of the patent.”). 
 337. See supra Part IV.D. 
 338. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antritrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 
2d 188, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) “([N]o matter how valid a patent is – no matter how 
often it has been upheld in other litigation . . . or successfully reexamined . . . – it is 
still a gamble to place a technology case in the hands of a lay judge or jury . . . .  Even 
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ence of patent validity and/or infringement may differ from the decision in 
the infringement litigation because patent trials are often highly complex and 
because lay juries may simply get it wrong.339  In light of the inherent uncer-
tainty in placing patent rights in the hands of a lay judge or jury, patent hold-
ers will often estimate their probability of success at litigation far lower than 
their actual confidence in the validity of the patent.340  Even supremely confi-
dent patent owners believe that their chances of prevailing in the litigation 
rarely exceed 70%.341  A minimum 30% risk of anticipated monopoly profits 
being driven down to competitive levels for the remaining life of the patent 
will create a considerable bargaining zone for the brand-name and generic 
manufacturers to settle the litigation with a reverse payment.342  This uncer-
tainty subjects a firm to a number of costs associated with uncertain business 
planning, in addition to the obvious need to discount anticipated returns when 
deciding to invest in research and development.343  
In this sense there are two potential instances in which a rule condemn-
ing reverse payments would result in decisions that erroneously punish a pa-
tent holder.  First, patent holders could incur antitrust damages for using re-
verse payment to exercise their lawful right to exclude a generic entrant.344  
However, this type of error would occur under a regime in which such con-
demnation applied only a presumption of illegality or otherwise allowed for 
some exceptions in which reverse payments would be lawful.  Firms would 
respond to a rule that held reverse payments to be per se unlawful by instead 
litigating the infringement cases or striking settlements without reverse pay-
ments, meaning possible decision errors would be limited to an erroneous 
decision in the infringement litigation.345  Since a deferential regime will not 
tend to produce false convictions, and a prohibition on reverse payments will 
  
the confident patent owner knows that the chances of prevailing in [patent] litigation 
rarely exceed seventy percent . . . .  Thus, there are risks involved even in that rare 
case with great prospects.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 
617, 626 (2006) (“[T]he risk of an erroneous decision in a patent case is a simple fact 
of life.”). 
 339. See Bernard & Tom, supra note 338, at 626. 
 340. See id. 
 341. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 
208 (referencing defendant’s memorandum in opposition to motion for partial sum-
mary judgment). 
 342. See id. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 395 (2003);  see also Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Con-
troversy over Patent Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se 
Illegal, in 21 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS:  ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
475, 484 tbl.4 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004). 
 345. Shapiro, supra note 344, at 395. 
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/13
File: Owens – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on: 3/19/2014 4:53:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:49:00 PM 
2013] A CURE FOR COLLUSIVE SETTLEMENTS 1391 
cause parties to not enter into reverse payment agreements in the first place, 
the Type II error risks relevant to a per se rule are confined to the risk of an 
erroneous outcome in the infringement litigation. 
It is important to appropriately characterize this error.  Recall that the 
grant of a patent represents a probabilistic property right,346 a right to “try to 
exclude” as opposed to a “right to exclude.”347  It is true that patent litigation 
is highly uncertain and imperfect.348  However, the resulting decision in in-
fringement litigation – a legal determination of whether the patent at issue can 
lawfully exclude the conduct of that particular alleged infringer – is perhaps 
the only instance where status of a patent right is definitively known.349  The 
probabilistic nature of patent rights perhaps receives too little attention by 
advocates of the scope of patent test.   For example, one commentator charac-
terizes the situation as follows:  
Suppose, hypothetically, that a patent owner believes there to be a 
60% chance that its patent will be held valid and infringed, and a 40% 
chance that it will be held invalid or not infringed.  Suppose it also 
perceives that, absent an agreement, the generic will enter prior to the 
conclusion of the patent litigation.  If the settlement prevents such en-
try, then 40% of the time it will have prevented a price decrease to 
consumers, but 60% of the time it will have prevented the theft of intel-
lectual property.350  
Bernard proceeds to argue that the social costs occasioned by a regime that 
permits “theft” of patent rights are sufficiently large to justify reverse pay-
ments as a means of prevention.351  This characterization is problematic in 
two respects.  First, it privileges non-judicial assessments of patent validity, 
specifically the USPTO’s initial grant and the perspectives of the patentee 
and the generic rival.  The USPTO’s “rational ignorance”352 in determining 
the initial grant of the patent, and the incentive alignment353 between the pa-
tentee and the generic entrant to keep the patent exclusion intact, counsels 
strongly against relying on such non-judicial determinations in this in-
  
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 350. Bernard & Tom, supra note 338, at 622 (emphasis added). 
 351. See id. at 622-23 (“This theft is not merely of private concern.  The implicit 
bargain [of the patent system] is that [for society as a whole] the short-term loss in 
static allocative efficiency [caused by patents] will be more than offset by the gain in 
dynamic efficiency resulting from the reward to innovation that patents confer.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 352. See supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra Part IV.D. 
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stance.354  For all its inefficiencies, an infringement trial at least eliminates 
the need to assess whether entry is valid or unlawful in probabilistic terms 
and instead provides a conclusive determination about whether the generic 
entrant did in fact infringe or, alternately, whether the brand-name had no 
legal right to exclude because of invalidity or non-infringement.355  Second, 
Paragraph IV litigation provides for a declaration of patent infringement prior 
to market entry, including a stay on entry until the resolution of the litiga-
tion,356 which in most instances will safeguards against any “theft” intellectu-
al property.  As a result, it is difficult to see how a liability rule which en-
courages fully litigated infringement claims will tend to produce false convic-
tions because the assertion of those rights in court represents the full exercise 
of the rights conferred under the patent.  
While the concern about jury competence to decide increasingly tech-
nical patent cases certainly appears valid, it is difficult to quantify.            
Assessments of the accuracy of jury verdicts are difficult because it is diffi-
cult to benchmark verdicts with any objective measure of accuracy.  Some 
studies have compared the performance of district court findings with special-
ized patent tribunals, finding no significant rate of reversal by the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals.357  Other studies have looked at the twenty-      
eight percent reversal rate of district court findings by the Federal Circuit    
on claim construction maters.358 Further, even acknowledging legitimate 
skepticism about courts’ ability to decide patent infringement cases with  
accuracy and consistency, there is an important qualitative difference between 
error verdicts and errors that result because the law gives parties an incentive 
collude to thwart discovery of the underlying merits. A fully litigated,      
adversarial infringement case, including the availability of appellate review, 
represents the legal system’s most thorough means of resolving the uncertain 
status of the patent.359  
Finally, regardless of how justified concerns of inaccurate ver-         
dicts may be, the reverse payment problem is not an instance where the law 
  
 354. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 356. Although, this stay is capped at thirty months.  See supra note 96 and ac-
companying text. 
 357. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and 
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1700 (2009) 
(“This study does not find any evidence that the patent-experienced ALJs of the ITC 
are more accurate at claim construction than district court judges or that the ALJs 
learn from the Federal Circuit’s review of their decisions.”). 
 358. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve 
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2001) (evaluating results of de novo 
review of district court claim construction and questioning the notion that judges 
represent a more competent alternative for patent adjudication than juries). 
 359. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
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should recognize litigation uncertainty as a reason to permit parties to cir-
cumvent its fundamental truth finding process. This is because the parties’ 
settlement decisions occasion costly externalities, which are borne by con-
sumers.360  In a purely private dispute, settlement should be permitted be-
cause the rights at stake in litigation do not impact anyone but the parties to 
the settlement.361  In patent settlements, the incentives of the parties are 
aligned against a large, unrepresented constituency – consumers, with any 
bargaining discrepancies between the settling parties essentially being subsi-
dized out of consumers’ pockets.362  Consumers are left with a level of access 
lower than what would have prevailed under expected outcomes of litiga-
tion,363 and encouraging litigated patent trials means that the consumer inter-
est underlying patent and antitrust policy enters into the result.364  Because of 
these concerns, the risks stemming from erroneous infringement verdicts are 
both less probable and of a fundamentally less concerning character than the 
risk of false acquittals resulting from a regime which is highly deferential to 
pay-for-delay agreements. 
F. Cost of a False Conviction: Magnitude of False Convictions 
Probabilities of error alone do not tell the whole story.  This analysis 
must also consider the magnitude of loss caused by the commission of each 
respective error type.365  Recall that a per se prohibition on settlements utiliz-
ing reverse payments would not produce errors in the sense that courts would 
be deciding and inappropriately imposing antitrust liability in cases before 
them because parties would not enter such settlements where they were con-
demned per se.366  The more important result of a regime that prohibits re-
verse payments is that the cost of patent uncertainty is borne by the holders of 
patents.367  This cost will not just include the actual resources such as legal 
and judicial time but also the reduced innovative efficiency that may result 
from over deterring benign exercises of patent exclusion and the changes to 
  
 360. See supra Part IV.D. 
 361. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at *55, FTV v. Actavis, Inc., 133      
S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (“[F]or instance, if you had two . . . firms fighting 
over a million dollars and each firm decided internally, 600,000 is the least I will 
accept.  If they stuck to their guns, the case could not be settled.  Now, if the public 
could be made to kick in an additional 200,000, then each of the firms could get its 
600,000 and walk away content.  But we don’t pursue the policy in favor of settle-
ment to that degree.”). 
 362. See Shapiro, supra note 344, at 394. 
 363. See id. at 396. 
 364. See id. at 395. 
 365. See Bernard & Tom, supra note 338, at 627. 
 366. See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 367. See Bernard & Tom, supra note 338, at 626-27. 
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investment decisions resulting from less certain exclusionary rights.368  “Dy-
namic innovative efficiency in the context of pharmaceutical patent litigation 
relates to how effectively the Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives to pio-
neer drug manufacturers to develop and market drugs.”369  This risk com-
mands great attention – as Judge Easterbrook noted, “An antitrust policy that 
reduced prices by 5 percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent the 
annual rate at which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a 
calamity.  In the long run a continuous rate of change, compounded, swamps 
static losses.”370  
A pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturer faces the following incentives  
to innovate:  
A firm will sink funds into research and development when the pre-
sent value of the expected future income stream from the developed 
product meets or exceeds its development and production costs.  In 
calculating the expected future income stream of the product, the 
company will account for the possibility that a successful and profita-
ble patent will be declared by a court to be invalid.  Settlement oper-
ates as a form of insurance against the risk of a declaration of invalidi-
ty.  By providing a range of certain outcomes, settlement increases the 
ex ante value of a drug to manufacturers who maintain even a nominal 
level of risk aversion.  Thus, settlements form part of the Hatch-
Waxman set of incentives to innovate in the pharmaceutical field, and 
their removal or restriction in this arena could be damaging in the long 
term.371 
Pharmaceutical firms rely on the profits earned from “blockbuster drugs” not 
only to recoup the research and development costs of those particular drugs 
but also to subsidize losses sunk into research projects that do not yield a 
marketable drug and the production and marketing of loss-making or less 
profitable drugs.372  The importance of patents to pharmaceutical innovation 
illustrates the potential social harm from unjustified generic entry,373 and 
consumers certainly would bear much of the loss caused by a reduction in 
pharmaceutical innovation.374  While the magnitude of this type of harm is 
extremely difficult to quantify, estimates of the value of pharmaceutical inno-
vation generally can shed some light: one study indicates that that new drugs 
accounted for 40% of the total increase in life expectancy from 1986 to 
  
 368. See id. 
 369. Hastings, supra note 301, at 34. 
 370. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, 
AND COMPETITIVENESS 119, 122-23 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992). 
 371. Hastings, supra note 301301, at 48. 
 372. Id. at 46. 
 373. Id. at 57. 
 374. Id. at 34. 
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2000;375 another study found that each additional dollar spent on using a new-
er prescription medicine (instead of an older one) saves roughly $3.95 in oth-
er health care costs;376 and yet another study found that reductions in heart 
disease mortality in the U.S. between 1970 and 1998 were worth approxi-
mately $1.1 trillion per year and that the gains from pharmaceutical innova-
tion in heart disease alone could amount to more than $300 million per 
year.377  Proponents of reverse payments are right to point out the consumer 
welfare stake in preserving adequate incentives for pharmaceutical innova-
tion.  The question then becomes, to what extent would innovation actually 
suffer under a regime that prohibited the use of reverse payments? 
There is reason to believe that a number of effects would mitigate any 
threat to innovation incentives resulting from less deferential assertion of 
patent rights.  First is the tendency of settlements to reduce the reward for 
true innovation vis-a-vis pseudo-innovation, thereby distorting a firm’s in-
vestment choice toward pseudo-innovation and leading to a lower rate of true 
innovation.378  Indeed, it has become a popular criticism that pharmaceutical 
firms are overly focused on creating compounds just different enough from a 
pioneer compound to extend patent protection but that only provide minimal 
or nonexistent therapeutic improvements.379  Prohibiting reverse payments 
may therefore help recalibrate incentives toward producing the type of bona 
fide innovation that the patent system seeks to promote. 
Second, the argument that reverse payments are necessary to preserve or 
enhance the expected value of patents overlooks that litigation uncertainty is 
only one relevant source of patent devaluation.380  The need to make large 
exclusion payments to a potential generic rival forces a patentee to depart 
with an often substantial share of the patent’s value.381  Similarly, availability 
of reverse payments also incentivizes generic firms to seek Paragraph IV 
entry based on the value of the drug and not the strength of the patent.382  
Even for strong patents, generic challengers can almost always leverage the 
inherent uncertainty of infringement litigation to “rent-seek” off of valuable 
patents.383  The relative certainty of this payoff to the generic means that they 
  
 375. Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity: 
Evidence from Longitudinal, Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries, 1982-2001 21 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9754, 2003). 
 376. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? 
Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFF. 241, 248 (2001). 
 377. Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Economic Value of Medical Re-
search, in MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL RESEARCH: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 41, 41-42 (Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel eds., 2010). 
 378. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 312, at 394-95. 
 379. See supra notes 306-312 and accompanying text. 
 380. See Hastings, supra note 301, at 54. 
 381. See id. 
 382. See id. at 56. 
 383. See id. at 54. 
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have little reason to base their challenges on the strength of the patent, so they 
might as well challenge good patents.384 As a result, holders of strong patents 
are “collateral victims of a policing mechanism that is ineffective at tackling 
bad patents.”385  If reverse payments were not available, generic challengers’ 
gain from filing a Paragraph IV certification would be far less certain, and 
there they would be more likely to make a Paragraph IV certification only if a 
patent was actually vulnerable.386  By removing the incentive for generics to 
target patents based on their value and not their strength, strong patents would 
be better protected from both litigation risk and value extraction by rent-
seeking generics.387  Depending on the extent of these effects, a prohibition 
on reverse payments may better promote the very innovation incentives that 
proponents of reverse payments worry about.  At a minimum, the combina-
tion of these effects will tend to mitigate the magnitude of loss occasioned by 
any reduced innovation resulting from the removal of reverse payments as a 
means of protecting patents. 
G.  Costs of False Acquittals 
A false acquittal will occur when a brand-name manufacturer and gener-
ic challenger use reverse payments to restrict competition in the market for a 
drug beyond the exclusion that would have resulted from a properly decided 
infringement case.  Part IV(D) has demonstrated why parties face an incen-
tive to settle regardless of the merits of the underlying patent claim, making 
false acquittals very likely under a regime that permits settlement so long as 
the settlement excludes competition only within the formal scope of the pa-
tent.388  Therefore, the loss occasioned by the commission of a false acquittal 
will include the loss of what economists call “static allocative efficiency.”389  
The loss of static allocate efficiency can be quantified as the difference in 
total wealth that will be produced in a market that remains monopolized only 
because a patent that would have otherwise been invalidated is permitted to 
restrain entry into the market by reverse payments, and the level of wealth 
had the generic challenger prevailed in litigation and introduced competition 
  
 384. See id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See id. 
 387. See id. 
 388. See supra Part IV.D. 
 389. See Hastings, supra note 301, at 49 (“Commentators such as Hemphill, 
Hovenkamp, and Lemley argue that reverse payments are suspicious on the under-
standable presumption that if a drug maker is willing to pay another to drop a chal-
lenge and stay off the market for a number of years, the likelihood seems greater that 
the patent in question is weak or ill-gotten.  Thus agreements involving such pay-
ments effectively safeguard bad patents, and force lengthened monopoly and later 
duopoly prices that society should not have to pay.”). 
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into the market for the drug.390  This is precisely the type of efficiency that 
antitrust law seeks to promote.391  These costs will arise both when a court 
erroneously acquits a defendant in an antitrust challenge to a reverse pay-
ment, as well as when parties opt to engage in reverse payments that go un-
challenged because the applicable antitrust laws make conviction difficult.  
The FTC released a study in 2010 (FTC Study) that attempted to quanti-
fy the magnitude of the allocative inefficiencies resulting from these settle-
ments.392  The FTC Study first observed the dramatic differences that compe-
tition can make in the market for a drug, noting that generic prices “can be as 
much as 90 percent less than brand prices.”393  The study analyzed settle-
ments that occurred between January 1, 2004, and September 30, 2009,394 and 
found that reverse payments on average prohibit generic entry for nearly sev-
enteen months longer than agreements without payments.395  The FTC Study 
concluded that prohibiting reverse payments in settlements would save con-
sumers an average of 3.5 billion dollars per year.396 This cost appears to far 
exceed any added decision costs that would result from a greater number of 
challenges litigated to judgment,397 the most commonly cited rationale for 
encouraging settlement.  
H.  Availability of Alternative Settlement Mitigates  
the Costs of Per Se Illegality 
It is more likely that pharmaceutical firms will be much better posi-
tioned to respond to a harsh liability rule in a way that reduces the costs        
of that rule than that consumers will be able to respond to a deferential rule in 
a way that reduces the costs of collusive behavior.  While pay-for-delay   
settlements are more desirable to both brand-name and generic manufacturers 
  
 390. See id. at 49-50. 
 391. See supra Part II.A. 
 392. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS 
BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY (2010) [hereinafter FTC STUDY]. 
 393. Id. at 1 (“For example, brand-name medication that costs $300 per month 
might be sold as a generic for as little as $30 per month.”). 
 394. Id. at 7. 
 395. Id. (calculating average using a weighted average based on sales of             
the drugs). 
 396. Id. at 1.  The study did acknowledge that by that varying assumptions regard-
ing the probability of reverse settlement and the average delay resulting forum the 
settlement; this number could range from 7.5 billion on the high end to .6 billion on 
the low end.  Id. at 8.  The FTC Study arrived at 3.5 billion (and 35 billion over the 
next 10 years) by using what it considered to be the most “reasonable” estimates 
based on the means of the data.  Id.  At any point in this range, the dollar cost of false-
ly permitting a settlement to restrain generic competition imposes staggering cost on 
consumers.  Id. 
 397. See supra Part IV.C.  
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than other types of settlement,398 there remains the question of whether     
such payments are essential if infringement litigation is to be settled at all.399  
Experience provides reason to believe they are not.  From 2000-2004, when 
the enforcement was aggressive and antitrust precedent most hostile to     
reverse payments, not one of the settlement agreements reported to the FTC 
involved reverse payments.400  However, parties were still able to find     
terms on which to settle their infringement litigation, and these terms were 
much less restrictive to competition.401  It was only in 2005, after the Scher-
ing and Tamoxifen courts blessed these agreements, that the pay-for-delay 
trend took off.  In 2005, three out of eleven settlements included such     
payments,402 and in 2006, fourteen of twenty-eight settlements contained 
these provisions.403  These numbers suggest that, while pay-for-delay agree-
ments are attractive to the parties, less restrictive alternatives often will prove 
to be sufficient to avert litigation costs.  For example, parties can cross-
license various patents without insisting on market division,404 divide up the 
remaining patent term and permit for early entry,405 or license the patent in 
exchange for royalty payments from the patentee.406  These types of agree-
ments all have some sort of procompetitive benefit and, more importantly, pit 
  
 398. See supra Part IV.D. 
 399. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2005 1 
(2006) [hereinafter FTC 2005 FILINGS], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/ 
04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf. 
 400. The requirement that parties file their settlements with the FTC was a result 
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
and therefore the only reported year in the 2000-2004 sample was 2004.  See BUREAU 
OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION 
ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2004 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/01/05107medicareactrpt.pdf.  Still, the FTC noted in the 
initial 2004 report that it “is aware of no final settlements of patent litigation in the 
pharmaceutical industry in which the brand paid the generic to agree not to market its 
product.  Neither the six settlements entered in 2000 and 2001 nor the fourteen set-
tlements reported under the MMA contained payments in exchange for the generic’s 
agreement not to market its product.”  Id. at 4. 
 401. See FTC 2005 FILINGS, supra note 400, at 4. 
 402. Id. at 3. 
 403. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2006 4 
(2007) [hereinafter FTC 2006 FILINGS], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
mmact/MMAreport2006.pdf. 
 404. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 19, at 1723-24. 
 405. See id. at 1736. 
 406. Id. 
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the parties in an adversarial rather than collusive posture, which ensures that 
the underlying merits of the infringement litigation factor into the settlement 
calculus.407  But because these arrangements are likely to be sufficient to 
avoid litigation408 many of the costs and uncertainties associated with in-
fringement litigation can still be avoided, thereby mitigating the concerns 
about a per se rule against reverse payments. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis explores many important determinants of error 
costs relevant to the desirability of applying harsh or deferential antitrust 
rules to pay-for-delay settlements.  By carefully considering risk of error re-
sulting from a regime that permits or prohibits reverse settlements,409 as well 
as the magnitude of the cost resulting from the commission of each respective 
error type,410 this analysis suggests that a per se illegality of reverse payments 
provides the most efficient liability to guide courts and firms in evaluating 
settlements of Paragraph IV litigation.  Pharmaceutical firms are better able to 
respond to a harsh liability rule in a way that reduces the cost of a rule than 
consumers are able to respond to a deferential rule in a way that reduces the 
costs of collusive behavior.  The gain to the settling parties at the expense of 
consumers can represent a huge transfer of wealth to the settling parties, often 
beyond what is justified by the patent.411  The risk of these types of errors, 
along with the massive costs that they impose in terms of lost wealth, justifies 
a harsh rule.  When dealing with an issue where courts have far from perfect 
information there will remain error costs in the other direction.412  However, 
because this risk of error will force parties to litigate their disputes to conclu-
sion, or strike a settlement that pits the parties in an adversarial posture, the 
law should be more comfortable with these types of errors.413  While rule of 
the reason approach has been declared the law, a rule of per se illegality – 
while imperfect – presents the most efficient rule for resolving the problem of 
pay-for-delay settlements in Paragraph IV patent disputes.   
 
  
 407. To illustrate, consider a brand-name manufacturer with ten years re-      
maining on its patent.  If it believes it has a seventy percent chance of prevailing at 
trial, then it is willing to give up three years of the patent term to avoid litigation.  
Under these less restrictive settlements, consumers will enjoy a level of competition 
that better approximates what would have resulted had the infringement cases been 
litigated to judgment. 
 408. See FTC 2005 FILINGS, supra note 400. 
 409. See supra Part IV.D, IV.E. 
 410. See supra Part IV.F, IV.G. 
 411. See supra Part IV.F. 
 412. See supra Part IV.E, IV.G. 
 413. See supra Part IV.G. 
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